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CONCLUSION 
There is a complex knot of forces underlyfng any nation once 
Christian; a smoldering of the old fires. --Hilaire Belloc 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that many, if not most, 
conflicts between church and state are consequences of the fragmentation 
of Christianity. The divisions within American politics and religion 
strongly resemble those that split the Roman Catholic Church at the time 
of the Reformation. They may represent in part the unfinished business 
of the Reformation, which had been diverted from much of its original 
purpose by the political and military considerations that intervened 
from the beginning. 
If the issues raised by the Reformers were never fully resolved, 
neither were they always fairly aired. As in the ancient hydraulic 
civilizations, religion was valued--perhaps primarily--as a means of 
social regulation. Doctrinal and liturgical changes became highly 
charged political issues, often deliberately encouraged or suppressed by 
political rulers, military leaders, and nationalist movements. 
Consequently, the legacy of the religious wars of Europe has been one of 
fragmentation and skepticism. 
The cultural byproducts are evident everywhere, but especially in 
America, which was settled during this period. Since the colonies 
lacked well-established institutional channels--especially after the 
Restoration in England--to contain the crosscurrents of religious 
innovation, experimentalism in religion spilled out into all areas of 
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cultural life. Sidney Mead has concluded that circumstances favored 
those denominations of the separatist tradition that treat politics with 
d . d . 2 lS aln. 
It is misleading to describe the product of these changes as 
political atheism, secularism, or even desacralization. Like western 
science, modern "secularization" derives much of its specific character 
from the dominant Christian culture of its origin. 3 Indeed, the 
transformation of western culture has proceeded, as it were, 
symphonically: the major themes may be distinguished from particular 
national variations. James Jordan attributes the cultural and religious 
individualism of recent centuries, which reached an extreme in what he 
designated "the American Baptist culture," to a hypertrophy of 
4 
nominalism that began in the late Middle Ages. Thomas Cuming Hall 
found the mainspring of American culture in "the English dissenting 
tradition." 5 Richard Mouw, in turn, claims that American Protestantism 
is splintered into four patterns of thought--doctrinalism, pietism, 
moralism, and culturalism--that variously emphasize doctrinal purity, 
personal piety or enthusiasm, practical wisdom, and cultural 
transformation.6 In a case study, Stanley Elkins contended that the 
issue of slavery in America was addressed moralistically rather than 
institutionally because, by the 1830s, 
the power of so many American institutions had one by one 
melted away. The church had fallen into a thousand parts .... 
The very ease with which the great evangelical sects could divide, 
by a sort of cellular fission, into myriads of tiny independent 
units, showed that the institutional balance between official 
coercton and individual self-expression had completely broken 
down. 
Church discipline, like family discipline, is often in a deplorable 
588 
state today, leaving the field open increasingly to civil intervention. 
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so does political power. As a rule, 
Americans are ambivalent toward authority. Michael .Kammen has gone so 
far as to portray Americans as ambivalent by nature: "people of 
8 paradox." But the tension between liberty and authority may be a 
creative one. It is also demanding, as Robert Winthrop, a nineteenth 
century political leader, recognized: 
All societies of men must be governed in some way or other. The 
less they may have of stringent State Government, the more they 
must have of individual self-government. The less they rely on 
public law or physical force, the more they must rely on private 
moral restraint. Men, in a word, must necessarily be controlled, 
either by a power within them, or by a power without them; either 
by the Word of God, or by the strong arm of man; either by the 
Bible, or by the bayonet. It may do for other countries and other 
governments to talk about the State supporting religion. Here, 
under our ~wn free institutions, it is Religion which must support 
the State. 
Unfortunately for the sake of these free institutions, it is easy 
to forget the price paid for them. The observation of Fyodor 
Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor is continually being borne out: "There is 
nothing more alluring to man than freedom of conscience, but neither is 
th th . . . n 10 ere any lng more agonlzlng. Although the centralization of power 
has been attributed to the externalities urbanization and 
industrialization, these challenges only further exacerbated Elkins's 
internal "cellular fission" r.vhich had begun by the 1830s and which have 
inspired various escapes from freedom. The transition from 
inner-directed to other-directed personality types is symptomatic of a 
more general cultural change. The challenge, as always, is to reconcile 
the best of both worlds. What this may require is a periodic 
rededication to first principles and a reconstitution of the goals and 
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purposes articulated by countless generations of founders and builders. 
In terms of American constitutional thought, much has changed. If 
there is a tension between the religion clauses in the Constitution, 
this may be due to more deep-seated divisions and contradictions in our 
country's historical experience. If Americans are a people of paradox, 
as Michael Kammen claims, then one need not go further for evidence than 
a consideration of the peculiar social, political, and religious 
interaction between church and state in America. This history may be 
read as part of a continuing drama. The dilemmas that fill its pages 
suggest the operation of something like Bergson's law of dichotomy and 
twofold frenzy. 
First, there is the tension underlies our definition of religion. 
Consensus and pluralism--unity and diversity--are dialectically placed 
in opposition to each other. Yet both are required within a society. A 
diversity of expression requires a unity of principles. The two poles 
of this dynamic are represented by two cases nearly a century apart. 
The definition of religion in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890), 
was fairly specific: 
The term "religion" has reference to one's views of his relations 
to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for 
his being and character, and of obedience to his will. It is often 
confused with the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, 
but is distinguishable from the latter. 
The primary emphasis here is on religion as the foundation of society. 
Obligations and obedience are not simply matters of individual concern. 
If there is an irreconcilable conflict between the religious and 
political obligations by which a people is governed, there can be no 
basis for unity. 
590 
The importance of unity amidst diversity should not be minimized. 
Throughout history, nations and civilizations have responded to 
ideological discord in a variety of harsh ways: the persecuting 
syncretism of the Roman Empire, the medieval rivalry between Guelphs and 
Ghibellines, the massacre of the Huguenots in France, the exile of 
non-Lutherans by Sweden, the anticlerical neopaganism of the French 
revolutionaries, and the countless final solutions waged on a national 
scale against the people of twentieth century Turkey, Germany, Russia, 
China, Cambodia, and Uganda to mention only a few. Paul Valery's 
European Hamlet now has millions more ghosts to watch. The American 
solution has been to institutionalize factional differences by 
permitting their peaceful competition. But this may continue to work 
only as long as the trivialization of these differences can be resisted. 
Sooner or later, fundamental disagreements have to be confronted 
directly. 
It appears that in its Ballard, Seeger, and Welsh decisions the 
Court chose to change the terms of debate. It thus broke with the 
theistic conception of religion and stretched it beyond the bounds of 
constitutional usefulness except as one consideration among many that 
must be balanced against the interest of the state. This lack of 
definition has become characteristic of recent cases, as exemplified by 
the indefinite use of the word religion in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 
U.S. 707, 714 (1981 ): "The determination of what is a 'religious' belief 
or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task. 
On any other subject, the Court might have deferred to expert testimony 
to help it make such a determination. Since this might seem to be an 
" 
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establishment of religion, the Court has chosen to proceed by 
indirection and negation: "· . religious beliefs need not be 
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to 
merit First Amendment protection." Such a statement is particularly 
ironic in light of recent decisions in the Hardison, Lee, and Bob Jones 
University cases in which religious expressions of varying degrees of 
acceptability, logic, consistency, and comprehensibility were denied 
First Amendment protection. 
Despite this tension, both definitions have been clearly, if not 
explicitly, at work in a contrapuntal fashion. If Christianity in a 
general sense is not the primary civil standard of religion, then what 
explains the virtual absence of Supreme Court decisions respecting the 
free exercise rights of mainline denominations? What explains the 
Court's decisions on polygamy, Sunday laws, religious tax exemptions, 
chaplains, and creches? Critics may challenge the orthodoxy of this 
civil religion but the imprint of its Christian origins is still 
visible. This may be why Christians are often so comfortable with its 
celebrations and ideals even though they may complain about specific 
doctrines or applications. But many Christians have grown wary of its 
embrace. As a character in a book by Os Guinness astutely observes: 
"Christianity contributed to the rise of the modern world; the modern 
world, in turn, has undermined Christianity; Christianity has become its 
own gravedigger." 11 
This brings us to the legacy of state religion, the second element 
within this dynamic tension. The two poles here are represented by two 
other cases. In Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 49 (1815), the Court 
held: 
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. . the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be 
restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every 
sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establishing 
funds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for the 
endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the dead. 
Early disagreements over tax support of Christian teachers, compulsory 
church attendance, glebe lands, mortmain, incorporation of churches, the 
disposition of indefinite bequests, the use of the Bible in public 
schools, the observance of Sunday as a day of rest, the use of religious 
tests and oaths, the employment of chaplains, the exemption of churches 
from taxes, and the enforcement of blasphemy laws--to name a 
few--indicate an underlying agreement about the importance of religion 
in national and local life. Many of these disagreements date back to 
the Reformation and earlier. Many of the practices associated with 
state religion--such as the tax exemption of churches, the exemption of 
ministers from civil and military service, and the law of charity--are 
equally antique. 
This history of striving factions makes it clear why the Court 
continually attempted to distinguish between religion as it was commonly 
professed and the sectarian forms through which it was practiced. The 
opposite pole in this dichotomy is the understandable desire to insulate 
politics from religious strife and religion from political meddling. 
This view is well-expressed in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 
1 ' 16 ( 1 94 7) : 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or 
groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a 
wall of separation betwen church and state." 
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But this disestablishment of religion has failed to insulate religion 
and politics from each other. Indeed, it may have only tipped the 
scales in favor of those ideologies that flourish outside the 
institutional church. 
A third element is secularization. Once again there is a basic 
opposition at work. In Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 307 (1896), 
civil and religious duty were seen as basically compatible despite their 
overlapping spheres of authority, as illustrated by this reference to 
the Ten Commandments: ''Those of them which are purely and exclusively 
religious in their nature cannot be made civil duties, but all the rest 
of them may be, in so far as they involve conduct, as distinguished from 
mere operations of the mind or states of the affections." The roots of 
this type of separation of church and state on the basis of a religious 
consensus may be found in the Bible, as E. C. Wines took pains to 
demonstrate by cataloging the fundamental principles of biblical 
government, which included: 1) the unity of God, 2) national unity, 3) 
civil liberty, 4) political equality of the people through property in 
the soil and sabbatical and jubilee years, 5) an elected magistracy, 6) 
popular ratification of laws, 7) responsibility of officers to the 
people signified by plebiscites and restrictions on royal prerogative, 
8) a cheap, speedy, and impartial administration of justice, and 9) a 
repression of the military spirit under the Mosaic law through the use 
of a militia rather than a standing army, an emphasis on an agricultural 
economy, a ban on horse breeding and the development of a cavalry, the 
sending of heralds with peace proposals, and compulsory attendance at 
religious festivals which inhibited wars of conquest. 12 These 
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principles and practices were studied, discussed, and applied by the 
early American settlers as a part of a political culture that gave rise 
to the Constitution. 
By the time of Stone v. Graham, 101 S.Ct. 192, 194 (1980), the 
magnification of the establishment clause had made this link between law 
and religion difficult to officially acknowledge: "The pre-eminent 
purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly 
religious in nature. The Ten Commandments is undeniably a sacred text 
in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a 
supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." But if it is an 
attribute of religion that its commands are often honored as much in the 
breach as in the observance, then a good case can be made that the 
Constitution is likewise a sacred text in the civil religious faith over 
which competing denominations wrangle. The one argument is no less a 
product of circular reasoning than the other. Although secularization 
obscures the link between law and religion, it does not sever it. The 
terms of political and theological debate are often astonishingly 
similar. 
Evidences of this link between law and religion are not difficult 
to find. Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Harold Berman have helped unearth 
the common origins of modern law and religion in medieval Europe. 13 
Resemblances are evident in the common scientific-scholastic language of 
law, theology, medicine, and other academic disciplines. The similarity 
of the traditional garb and installation ceremonies of priests, judges, 
and scholars is also noteworthy. Is this preservation of religious 
ceremonies a mere relic, as the Court maintained with regard to the 
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religious language in some of the Sunday closing laws? Or is the 
continuing use of the language of religion in a secular setting evidence 
of a common function and perhaps a displacement of the one by the other? 
Whether it is due to the desire for a common meeting ground or to 
the kind of transvaluation of which Friedrich Nietzsche wrote, 
secularization has tended to obscure rather than clarify the boundaries 
between church and state. But the fact that the church no longer 
occupies center stage does not mean that it is being left waiting in the 
wings. Religion has become, perhaps more than ever, a matter of 
personal reflection and application. Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy maintained 
that the gospel has been brought into the daily lives of men, women, and 
children through a series of revolutions that have taken place during 
the past millenium. He expected this process to continue until nothing 
of formal religion remained visible and believed this i-Jould be the 
. t f Ch . t. . t 1 4 VlC ory o rls lanl y. 
Religion must has its practical, civil dimension. Its realm is not 
confined to "mere operations of the mind or states of the affections," 
as the Supreme Court increasingly implies. The coincidence of political 
and religious theory requires careful attention if the conflicts between 
church and state over issues of mutual practical concern are to be 
resolved. The American constitutional system is deeply impressed with 
the aspirations of a people who wished to practice their faith in 
security and liberty. According to Christian doctrine, political and 
religious leadership are both ministries. Each sphere is authoritative 
and sovereign in its domain. In a society of pluralistic institutions 
like ours, separation of church and state cannot mean a high and 
596 
impregnable wall between church and state no matter how serious the 
potential for interference. Each has an interest in the good health of 
the other and each tends to act as a restraint on the other. But the 
persistence of conflict may well signal problems of a fundamental nature 
that may otherwise be difficult to pinpoint. Thus the church itself has 
an obligation to speak. 
It is for these reasons that the entanglements associated with an 
official state church should be avoided. The early commentators and 
judges distinguished between the encouragement of religion and the 
sponsorship of specific denominations or creeds. The direct 
subsidization of religion, like its direct taxation and regulation, 
creates entanglements that tend to lead to dependency and interference. 
A dependent or distracted church is likely to become a silent church. 
One of the historical roles of the church is to serve as the conscience 
of the state because one of the functions of the church is to proclaim 
God's wisdom and truth in all areas of life. This role was a customary 
part of a religious and political tradition that culminated in the 
American constitutional system. Early in the national period, however, 
the clergy began losing much of their earlier influence in New England 
due to a number of factors. Disestablishment usually took place in 
stages and denominational differences kept alive in the form of 
political controversies. The close identification of the New England 
clergy with the Federalists outraged many Republicans. Doctrinal 
disputes split many churches. If anything, the conditions of an 
increasingly pluralistic frontier society favored fragmentation, 
voluntary churches, and a greater emphasis in preaching on salvation and 
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revival. 
One of the assumptions behind the American system is that the state 
will never be lacking in advisers if the people have a voice. The 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 articulated the need to encourage education, 
morality, and religion in order to preserve the foundations of society. 
The church, the press, and the common school shared with the family and 
the community the responsibility for raising up an educated and informed 
citizenry. The role of the church in translating biblical principles 
into practical applications made it the indispensable conscience of the 
state. 
What about today then? Many churches still provide a forum for 
political discussion and the formulation of positions on specific 
issues. But differences in basic doctrine have perhaps never been 
greater. If there is safety in a multitude of counselors, there is no 
counsel where a common standard is lacking. The influence of the church 
has always lain in its ministry of preaching good tidings and 
proclaiming liberty throughout the land. Seen as one more interest 
group to be appeased, however, it is difficult to justify the need for a 
distinct emphasis on religious liberty. This appears to be the position 
that necessarily follows from an overbroad definition of religion and 
interpretation of the establishment and free exercise clauses. The 
recent Marsh, Mueller, and Lynch decisions are difficult to reconcile 
with existing establishment clause doctrines. The recent Lee and Bob 
Jones University decisions similarly conflict with earlier free exercise 
precedents. A foolish consistency may be the hobgoblin of little minds, 
but inconsistency is a doubtful virtue. 
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What may be concluded then about these developments in relation to 
recent conflicts between church and state? First, such conflicts may be 
encouraged by the absence of a clear constitutional standard with regard 
to the scope and limits of religious liberty, both individual and 
corporate. Given the formlessness of the current conception of 
religion, it is difficult to imagine that the Court could today rule 
against the practice of polygamy on any other basis than its own ipse 
dixit. The dichotomy of belief and action is ultimately meaningless in 
relation to the free exercise clause unless their is a doctrinal basis 
for affirming or denying a particular practice. Some kind of standard 
is unavoidable. Unfortunately, it is unlikely to be articulated and run 
the risk of having to be publicly debated and defended. 
Second, the notion that an exemption is a special privilege makes 
it difficult to uphold religious exemptions because of their 
establishment implications. This can be a positive development if it 
compels legislators to be more careful than ever to frame laws that do 
not infringe on constitutional liberties. It is not difficult to 
justify the Torcaso, Seeger, Welsh, and Thomas decisions as attempts to 
preserve constitutional liberties. But there was no need to convert the 
free exercise clause into a miscellaneous category in the process. The 
loss of exceptions and exemptions may consequently only further 
circumscribe those areas of liberty that were protected on religious 
grounds. 
Third, the uses to which the establishment clause has been put lend 
considerable support to the comment by James Hitchcock that "in practice 
an orthodoxy which loses its authority has trouble even retaining the 
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right of toleration. 1115 An establishment of religion can be understood 
in any of several ways. It can mean the exclusive favoring or 
subsidizing of a particular church, the indiscriminate encouragement of 
all churches, or the recognizing of a particular standard of religion. 
There is no doubt that, at the very least, the First Amendment forbade 
an official, exclusive establishment of religion, although it was 
another four decades before the last such establishment at the state 
level was abolished. But disestablishment meant only the dismantling of 
an official state religious apparatus. The church as a church had no 
legal existence. Yet there is no doubt that religion was encouraged and 
that religious societies were given the full protection of the law. 
The thesis that the state may aid all churches equally is supported 
by the early Supreme Court decisions, such as the opinion by Justice 
Story in the Terrett case: "the free exercise of religion cannot be 
justly deemed to be restrained by aiding with equal attention the 
votaries of every sect to perform their own religious duties, or by 
establishing funds for the support of ministers, for public charities 1 
for the endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the dead" (9 
Cranch 43, 49). This might be considered an establishment of the second 
degree but it is doubtful that such aid was regarded as a conduit for 
regulation. The Girard College and Davis cases make it evident that the 
term religion was fairly exclusive. The distinction between religion 
and its sectarian variants lends support to the thesis of Justice 
Douglas that "a 'religious' rite which violates standards of Christian 
ethics and morality is not in the true sense, in the constitutional 
sense, included within 'religion,' the 'free exercise' of which is 
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guaranteed by the Bill of Rights." 16 Thus religious liberty could be 
considered absolute within its proper sphere because a particular 
standard of religion was applied. This may be considered an 
establishment of the third degree. 
Perhaps the major source of difficulty today lies in the Court's 
failure to articulate the standard of religion it recognizes. If 
diplomacy is war conducted by other means, the same may be said about 
politics in relation to religion. Laws are not politically or 
religiously neutral. They reveal much about the basic assumptions, 
values, social mores, and priorities of a society. In that sense at the 
very least, all law represents an establishment of religion because it 
implies standards by which actions are weighed in the balance. If 
ignorance of the law is not an excuse, then the moral and religious 
foundations of law must be manifest, even if they are not fully 
articulated by the courts. This fact of law corresponds to a fact of 
religion observed by the Apostle Paul: 
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all 
ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in 
unrighteousness; Because that which may be known of God is manifest 
in them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible 
things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, 
being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal 
power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse ... (Rom. 
1 : 18-20). 
The one proposition is no less religious than the other. In fact, their 
correlation is strikingly evident. 
What then is the nature of this standard of law and religion that 
must be so evident that ignorance cannot be claimed as an excuse? In 
the nineteenth century, the law of the land was thought to include 
Christianity in one way or another. The courts qualified this assertion 
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in various ways in order to avoid favoring a particular creed or form of 
worship. But the Bible itself was regarded as a nonsectarian book. 
Today, by contrast, any citation of even the Ten Commandments would be 
regarded as an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 
If the principles of biblical religion are not established by the 
Constitution, then it is reasonable to ask what principles are 
established. Those who are concerned that a civil religion of secular 
humanism or some other variety of belief has been substituted for 
Christianity work from the view that a religiously neutral common ground 
is an impossibility. The contrary assumption that secular institutions 
may provide such a sanctuary or refuge is a common one but it is based 
on a particular conception of the scope of religion that may not be 
generally shared. The refuge analogy may be reversed and the exclusive 
areas for the practice of particular religions may be made the the 
object of special constitutional protection. But it is valid to ask 
what religious assumptions govern the lives of the guardians who are 
commissioned to defend the refuge walls. A safe haven may be easily 
converted into a free-fire zone once the walls are breached. Although 
religious liberty needs constitutional protection, political isolation 
of religious expression is not the proper means. 
This is the dilemma that underlies so many current conflicts. 
Churches are resisting what they perceive as political interference by 
civil officials through various fiscal, educational, and social 
regulations. If exemptions are to be made contingent on a restriction 
of their ministries and their ability to proclaim the gospel in all 
areas of life, many churches will refuse to submit. At some point they 
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will draw the line against further encroachments. Many will attempt to 
roll back existing regulations in the absence of assurances that they 
will not be interpreted as assertions of sovereign power by the state 
over the church. This is the frontier that the churches themselves must 
patrol. Secular regulation by the state is one thing when the lines of 
authority are clearly drawn and accepted, when interference with its 
ministries is impossible. It is quite another thing when the boundary 
markers have been removed and the sphere of church authority is 
constricted. 
Sidney Mead delineated these issues with particular clarity in 
regard to compulsory free public education. He began by noting the 
initial efforts to include "nonsectarian'' religious education in public 
schools and the controversies that resulted, which led eventually to the 
exclusion of the Bible from the classroom: 
Here are the roots of the dilemma posed by the acceptance of the 
practice of separation of church and state on the one hand, and the 
general acceptance of compulsory public education sponsored by the 
state on the other. Here is the nub of the matter that is all too 
often completely overlooked. It was very clearly stated by J. L. 
Diman in the North American Review for January, 1876. If it is 
true, he said, "that the temporal and spiritual authorities occupy 
two wholly distinct provinces, and that to one of these civil 
government should be exclusively shut up ... it would be 
difficult to make out a logical defense of our present system of 
public education. If, on the contrary, it be the right and duty of 
the state to enforce support of public education ... [upon all 
citizens], then our current theory respecting the nature and 
functions of the state stands in need of considerable revision." 
Diman's point is based upon the recognition that of necessity the 
state in its public-education system is and always has been 
teaching religion. It does so because the well-being of the nation 
and the state demands this foundation of shared beliefs. In other 
words, the public schools in the United States took over one of the 
basic responsibilities that traditionally was always assumed by the 
established church. In this sense the public-school system of the 
United States is its established church. But the situation in 
America is such that none of the many religious sects can admit 
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without jeopardizing its existence that the religion taught in the 
schools (or taught by any other sect for that matter) is "true" in 
the sense that it can legitimately claim supreme allegiance. This 
serves to accentuate the dichotomy between the religion of the 
nation inculcated by the state through the public schools, 1 ~nd the 
religion of the denominations taught in the free churches. 
Mead contended that "the religion of many Americans is democracy" 
and gave particular attention to the views of J. Paul Williams, who 
recommended that the public school system be used to "teach democracy 
and to bring 'the majority of our people to a religious devotion to the 
democratic way of life.'" Williams asserted that the traditional 
religions largely cancelled each other out and were irrelevant to the 
public welfare. He sought to enlist the aid of public agencies in 
awakening people to a devotion to democratic ideals. Referring to 
churches, he maintained that "at those points where religion is a public 
matter, those areas which contain the ethical propositions essential to 
corporate welfare, society will only at its peril allow individuals and 
sects to indulge their dogmatic whims."' 18 
If anything, the greater comprehensiveness of the political order 
today makes the protection of religious liberty more than ever a matter 
of public concern. In the absence of clearly defined limits on the 
power of the state to regulate religion, intermediate safeguards may be 
needed until the effects of existing regulations on civil and religious 
liberty can be thoroughly reviewed. 
As it is, churches already pay a variety of taxes and fees, most of 
them indirect and most of them fairly small. But the social security 
tax has been bringing the issue of tax exemption into sharp focus. The 
Court's rationale for its decision in the Lee case is that 
judicially-mandated religious exemptions are unwarranted given the 
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comprehensive actuarial structure of the social security program. The 
recent narrowing of the religious exemptions by Congress itself leaves 
little reason to believe that any exemptions will remain for very long. 
But if the financial problems that have nrecessitated a broadening of 
the social security tax base are not solved in the meantime, what then? 
The same might be asked of income and property taxes. Are there any 
limits to the financial needs of the state? To what lengths might the 
state pursue its interest in anticipating revenues and regulating their 
sources considering the fact that it must devote a growing portion of 
its current revenues to meeting outstanding debts and statutory 
obligations? Apart from the peculiarities of individual and social 
psychology that tend to favor what E. G. West calls "bureaucratic 
imperialism," 19 the fiscal crisis of the modern state may be a primary 
cause of the tightening of administrative controls, particularly in face 
of general disaffection with high taxes, high unemployment, high crime 
rates, declining affluence, unacceptable levels of illiteracy, and signs 
of cultural fragmentation. 
Whether or not the issues over taxation and regulation are 
satisfactorily resolved, resistance by churches is indicative of the 
depth of distrust that seems to pervade the political system. Steps 
need to be taken to preserve confidence in the constitutional system. 
But even at a minimum, any effort to protect religious as well as civil 
liberty may require radical changes in the political agenda and in 
public attitudes. Perhaps what is needed is a reactivation of a public 
philosophy that reflects the institutional pluralism which a 
constitutional system of government is designed to enhance. 
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The weakness of the present system may lie in the inordinate 
attention it must give to adjusting essentially unrelated or 
incompatible goals through legislation, litigation, and administrative 
law. In the abstract, full employment, high literacy, economic 
stability, social equality, free trade, industrial productivity, and 
personal freedom are all admirable goals. The difficulty is in bringing 
people to agree on the best way or the least restrictive means to 
achieve these goals. Thus all of these goals are subjected to continual 
negotiation and redesign. So conceived, politics has become an affair 
of lawyers, accountants, statisticians, and other specialists. Comments 
about government are commonly addressed in the third person plural or 
impersonally like the weather. In order to engage the public 
imagination, something more is needed than an incremental restructuring 
and balancing of political goals on the basis of economic forecasts or 
head counts in legislative chambers. An active and informed electorate 
requires a basic consensus and a sense of involvement in an overriding 
purpose. 
We have fortunately been spared the kind of political terrorism 
that is currently devastating other parts of the world. But this can 
change if disaffection continues to grow. On the surface, the causes of 
demoralization may be economic, racial, or educational but they leave 
deep spiritual wounds, such as the bitterness and malaise that followed 
the war in Indochina and the Watergate scandals. 
The prevailing spirit of this or any other time has been 
characterized by R. J. Rushdoony as "an omnipresent demand for 
justification." The reason is not difficult to fathom: 
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The fact of guilt is one of the major realities of man's existence. 
Both personally and socially, it is a vast drain on human energies 
and a mainspring of human action. Any attempt at assessing either 
political action or religious2baith apart from the fact of guilt is thus an exercise in futility. 
Corresponding to this sense of guilt is a demand for salvation and a 
need for atonement that colors the whole of personal and corporate life. 
"A common recourse is to self-atonement and self-justification. A 
modern term for such behavior is masochism, in the broader sense of that 
21 term." Rushdoony attributes psychosomatic ailments, gambling, 
alcoholism, certain types of philanthropy, "injustice-collecting," the 
will to failure, and suicidal activity as exercises in masochistic 
self-punishment. 
The passions that motivate individuals likewise move societies. 
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy suggested that the fabled hospitality of the 
British gentry concealed a guilty conscience because they had derived 
their fortunes from the plundering of the monasteries by Henry VIII. 
Thus they assumed the character and attributes of the institution they 
displaced. Much the same may be true of the philanthropy of many of the 
early captains of industries and their scions. Guilt is as much a 
distortion of perspective as greed. Today the state, which is but a 
reflection of the character of its people, has become a surrogate 
father, mother, church, school, and best friend. Its treasury totters 
on the verge of bankruptcy because it embraces every concern as its own 
and overextends its resources. Even then, its embrace--however welcome 
in an emergency--is often as cold as the facades of its monuments. 
The reach of public policy may exceed its grasp but it does 
illustrate an important fact. Material and spiritual concerns cannot be 
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neatly divided. For all practical purposes they must be considered 
together in regard to their causes and effects. From this viewpoint, 
politics and religion are simply two ways of regarding the human 
condition. Assuming this to be true, there is no area of life in which 
either politics or religion is irrelevant. There is also no area of 
life to which religious truth--as opposed to scientific truth--may be 
confined. The heart of the matter then is the relevancy or irrelevancy 
of particular religious doctrines to the relationship of man and God, 
the proper scope of civil government, or the concerns and obligations of 
daily life. In regard to politics, the issue is whether there is a 
foundation upon which a social, economic, cultural, and sectarian 
consensus may be built. 
For the founders of the American republic, the Christian faith 
provided such a foundation in law, morality, and education. Biblical 
principles were consciously even if imperfectly applied to civil 
government and law. Ministers and laymen were very often equally 
conversant in sacred and secular affairs because they possessed a common 
standard of reference. While serving as President, George Washington 
carefully nurtured good relations among the various religious faiths. 
Rev. John Witherspoon wrote an essay on money and signed the Declaration 
of Independence. Samuel Adams was a committed Christian layman as well 
as a populist firebrand. Their distinct personalities and diverse 
interests were bonded by a common religious culture that was once 
powerful enough to integrate a diversity of sects and nations. There 
were failures in this respect. These are often attributed to an 
imperfect standard of religious value but they may have been due more to 
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an imperfect understanding of its requirements that gradually has led to 
a loss of perspective and commitment. Richard Hildreth, Lysander 
Spooner, George Ticknor Curtis, George Bancroft, and John Burgess were 
among those who recorded the changing perceptions that transformed 
theology, constitutional law, and political values. 22 
Even though the state of affairs in America today is more fluid by 
comparison, it is still far from anomie. But the disintegration of the 
cultural consensus must be directly confronted in all areas of political 
life. General tax and spending reform is a primary need if the economy 
is to be restored. The use of taxation as a means of economic and 
social regulation is intrinsically dangerous to personal liberty. Some 
types of taxation--for example, the income, general property, and social 
security taxes--tend to decapitalize families and businesses. 
Regulations that dictate specific curriculum standards, teacher 
qualifications, and forms of social intercourse may specifically violate 
the precepts of Christianity, as the court in the Whisner case made 
clear. These will never be acceptable to many committed believers. 
Short of a major restructuring of our political institutions, 
intermediate steps are within reach, but they require a reconstitution 
of the political agenda and the ideological assumptions and priorities 
that shape it. One of the simplest steps would be to rethink the notion 
that an exemption is a privilege or subsidy. Exemptions may simply be 
the price that the state must pay for overstepping its traditional 
authority, engaging in activities or claiming powers that infringe on 
civil and religious liberties, or attempting to rewrite the laws of 
human nature. In a system of delegated powers, it is unclear why the 
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people who originally delegated them must bow to the demands of servants 
who multiply laws, carve empires out of every jot and tittle, and eat 
out their masters' substance. 
But if considerations of compelling state interest prevail over 
good judgment, alternative political arrangements might be attempted in 
an effort to reduce entanglements between church and state. Since the 
state provides various utilities on a fee basis, then perhaps a 
fee-for-service arrangement is possible even in regard to other public 
services, such as police and fire protection. Some communities have 
created police and fire departments on just such a basis. Churches 
could pool their resources to do the same and similarly do so with 
regard to other social welfare agencies. 
Rockne McCarthy, James Skillen, and William Harper have commended 
various European experiments in "consociational democracy" as 
illustrations of ways in which pluralistic educational establishments 
may be reconciled. 23 To the extent that these experiments represent 
liaisons or condominiums between public and private agencies, they are 
likely to remain subject to the whims of shifting political winds and 
are best avoided. But the principle of sphere sovereignty might be 
extended to a variety of public concerns. For example, church schools 
could create their own secular accrediting agencies in order to assure 
that certain standards be met. The establishment of centralized 
repositories of textbooks and supplies might help some of the smaller 
church schools with limited resources. A reduction of federal and state 
financial involvement in local schools might help equalize the financial 
burdens on parents who must pay twice for the privilege of a formal 
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religious education. An abolition of compulsory school attendance laws 
in favor of less restrictive means of encouraging an educated citizenry 
might be attempted. Special common law courts or juries could mediate 
disputes or require improvements. These developments would require an 
initial effort on the part of churches and private organizations to 
offer functioning alternatives. But as a practical political matter, 
schools that fail to join such associations are likely to remain subject 
to regular administrative or judicial controls until alternative 
institutions have matured. 
Prior to establishing a truly competitive marketplace and an 
equitable rather than a redistributive tax structure, the financial 
burdens of education might be more evenly divided by requiring at least 
partial tuition at public schools, particularly if this can help free 
school districts from the seven or eight percent controlling interest 
held by the United States Department of Education through federal 
grants. Similarly, all subsidies to all private schools might be 
terminated. The distinction between secular and religious purposes is 
an unnatural one. Subsidies are too often valued as regulatory 
d . 24 evlces. But if an activity is to be made subject to direct public 
support, then it should be capable of being restricted to an expressly 
public purpose and kept under strict public control. A removal of 
private schools and churches from the welfare rolls might have the added 
advantage of bringing a new sense of reality into the debate over public 
and private education and bringing it down to some very basic issues of 
economic justice, technical quality, and ideological purpose. 
Given the attitudes that now prevail, tuition tax credits and 
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vouchers can only lead to further administrative controls over a largely 
private area of responsibility. As an illustration, Donald Erickson has 
noted the appreciable negative impact of school aid on Catholic schools 
. c d 25 ln ana a. The continuing failure to divorce multilevel tax 
financing, compulsory attendance requirements, and secularization may 
become more divisive in coming years. Somewhere the Gordian knot must 
be cut. More options and fewer strings might help stimulate a rebirth 
of learning in both public and private schools. 26 
The sum and substance of this study may be summarized in three 
points that relate to the redefinition, conscription, and secularization 
of religion by the modern state. First, American law and custom still 
preserve elements of an earlier state church tradition despite the 
historical coincidence between the framing of the Constitution and the 
disestablishment of religion in the first degree. Second, the political 
and religious perspective of the founders is nevertheless so strongly 
impressed upon the constitutional system that discrepancies between the 
basic doctrines of Christianity and the expectations of diverse 
religious and secular subcultures are among the major sources of 
conflict within the political arena. At one time these conflicts were 
framed specifically in reference to a common biblical standard. Today 
the appeal is usually to a common moral idealism that remains 
recognizably Christian in form but only selectively Christian in 
practice. But, third, changing interpretations of the constitutional 
provisions respecting religion and a growing state presence in all areas 
of social and economic life tend to reduce the formal role of religion 
in public life, leading some religious leaders to express public concern 
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over losses of liberty and influence by the church. Current litigation 
indicates that churches are faced with unaccustomed restrictions on the 
corporate powers, tax immunities, internal operations, teaching 
ministries, and missionary activities of their organizations. 
Additionally, these concerns spill over into conflicts over taxes, 
subsidies, and regulations in general. 
A constitutional, republican form of government was originally 
adopted so that the kind of principles described by E. C. Wines could be 
applied despite denominational and ideological differences. Such a 
system is still essential to the preservation of religious liberty. The 
duties of religion are not obscure or unknowable. Laws that violate the 
revealed standards of Scripture must be rejected. The abortion 
controversy has brought many formerly uninvolved Christians into active 
political participation. School issues represent a second great area of 
concern. But any generally applicable, allegedly secular law that 
seriously penalized Christians and Jews or required them to violate 
their conscience would arouse concerted opposition. Supreme Court 
rulings in regard to Sunday closing laws and social security taxes have 
already raised the possibility. 
On the other side, distrust is already high within some religious 
circles. Many fundamentalist churches are dissolving their corporations 
and are actively resisting school licensing and social security 
requirements. Their success will depend in large part on the attitude 
taken in mainline and evangelical church circles. But if the major 
churches ever conclude they have been subjected to discriminatory laws 
that directly challenge their doctrines and practices, they will be 
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compelled to take a similar stand or drop all pretense of independence 
from the state. Doctrines concerning the ordination of ministers, the 
admission and discipline of members, the teaching and correction of 
children, the employment of church workers, and the proclaiming of the 
gospel leave no room for compromise. The example of the early apostles 
is clear on this point. When warned against teaching in the name of 
Christ, Peter replied: "We ought to obey God rather than men" (Acts 
5:29). 
Over a century ago Charles Hodge wrote: "Whatever Protestant 
Christianity forbids, the law of the land (within its sphere, i.e. , 
within the sphere in which civil authority may appropriately act) 
forbids." 27 A century earlier, Lord Mansfield wrote: "The essential 
principles of Revealed Religion are part of the Common-law. !128 
The doctrinal history of modern law largely bears out these 
declarations. Even today, the resemblances between law and religion are 
striking. Indeed, these statements by Hodge and Mansfield would be 
endorsed without modification by many Christians today. But these 
sentiments might be even more forcefully stated by noting that believers 
will refuse to do Hhat the Bible forbids. A society ignores "the 
essence of Revealed Religion" at its oHn peril, not because of injured 
feelings but because of offended realities that can result in great 
social harm. Religious liberty and social peace are unimaginable if the 
government can violate Hith seeming impunity the standards of the Bible. 
For committed Christians and JeHs, the Bible is still the final word on 
God, man, and the world: 
Shall the throne of iniquity have felloHship with thee, Hhich 
frameth mischief by a law? They gather themselves together against 
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the soul of the righteous, and condemn the innocent blood. But the 
Lord is my defence; and my God is the rock of my refuge. And He 
shall bring upon them their own iniquity, and shall cut them off in 
their own wickedness; yea, the Lord our God shall cut them off" 
(Ps. 94:20-23). 
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